

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP

WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 22

For week ending 1 June 1949

Volume II

The International Week

After a week of preliminary sparring at the CFM, the Soviet and Western positions were still far apart and there were no indications of any radical shift in Soviet tactics. The peace talks between Israel and the Arabs remained deadlocked at Lausanne.

RETREAT FROM WARSAW

A After a week of preliminary sparring in Paris, there are still no indications that the Kremlin is prepared to make any wide concessions on German unity to the Western Powers in order to secure a voice in all Germany. Although the Western Powers pressed Vishinsky to reveal the Soviet position on a political and economic program for Germany, the anticipated sweeping gesture of Soviet benignity toward the German people foreshadowed at Warsaw failed to materialize. Hammering on the need of first reestablishing four power control of Germany with the inevitable entanglement of the veto, the wily Soviet Foreign Minister held back disclosure of the shape of Moscow's proposals for Germany. Thereafter the Western Powers seized the initiative and trotted out their proposals to unify Germany politically and economically by extending the Bonn arrangements to the entire Reich. Vishinsky lost little time in indicating that these were unacceptable.

Back of the USSR's reluctance to relax its existing hold on Eastern Germany may be (1) lack of confidence in its ability to influence the course of German political evolution without tight controls and (2) skepticism as to Western willingness to remove overall controls on East-West trade. The returns from the Eastern German elections on the eve of the Paris meeting may have come as a severe jolt to the Russians although it is also possible that they were "rigged" in this manner to provide propaganda evidence of democracy in the Soviet zone. While the USSR will trumpet the "People's Congress" as the authentic voice of "democratic" Germany, using it as a propaganda counterweight to Bonn, this device will fool almost nobody, neither Germans nor the Politburo itself. Moreover, the Satellites have shown continuous apprehension over any haste in restoring German sovereignty. Soviet sensitivity as to this aspect of the problem is reflected in Malenkov's reassuring reference before the Czech Communist Party Congress to the "removal of the century-old threat to Slavdom -- the German aggressors."

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In short, the USSR may feel that it cannot safely match Western proposals to slacken controls over Germany. Unless it can effectively extend a minimum of influence over all Germany, the Kremlin seems loath to release its grip on the portion it now holds. Furthermore, Moscow may have counted upon a more eager Western response to the lifting of the Berlin blockade, at least a relaxing of trade restrictions against Eastern Germany. However, with the progress of the cold war, the Berlin counterblockade inevitably became merged in the larger economic war against the Slav bloc.

Nevertheless, the chances for the CFM's working out a limited solution of trade questions between East and West Germany appear better than the prospects of a broader German solution. For one thing, if the USSR retains control over its German zone, it is sure of remaining in a position to exact a rough mutuality of give and take in trade. Moreover, both sides would benefit from expanded trade between the East and West in general. In contrast, were the USSR to yield to the Western demand for an extension of Bonn over all Laender without a veto, or were the Western Powers to agree to an All German State Council acceptable to Moscow, each would largely surrender further bargaining power in Germany. Thus the outlook in Paris seems limited to achieving an economically more workable split of Germany. This might make a long cold war somewhat more endurable to all participants.

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
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possibility.

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West German labor will adhere to new democratic international. West German labor representatives will probably participate, on an informal basis, in the Geneva preliminary conference of free trade unions meeting on June 25 to form a new democratic world labor organization. The non-Communist German trade unionists of the Western Zones, although represented in the ECA Trade Union Advisory Committee and in the transport and miners internationals, have in the past been susceptible to the claim of the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions that it is the only truly international forum for the world's laboring classes. However, the federation's failure to obtain West German participation in its forthcoming Milan WFTU Congress apparently reflects growing recognition among West German labor leaders that WFTU actions in Germany are wholly subservient to Soviet policies. This conviction will probably gain still wider currency as a consequence of WFTU's pointed silence during the current struggle between Berlin's UGO railway workers and the Soviet railroad administration.

IOG NOTES

Japanese membership in the ITU. Seating of a Japanese Government Delegation at the ITU Paris Administrative Telephone and Telegraph Conference has become less likely as a result of the Conference's formal recognition of the SCAP representative and his Japanese technicians as "observers from SCAP." This action, coupled with Conference deferment of a vote on recognition of the Japanese delegation, will tend to weaken the US position favoring Japanese admission. It will now be argued that Japan is adequately

- 3 -

represented and that the issue can be postponed until the Far Eastern Commission renders a decision on the legality of SCAP's authorization of Japanese accession to the International Telecommunications Union.

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USUN Propaganda Committee proposed. The USUN Delegation has proposed formation of a continuing committee to win popular support for US policy by taking active advantage of the worldwide forum offered by the UNGA. The aim would be the double one of informing American public opinion and influencing foreign opinion. Between GA sessions, the committee would prepare public opinion materials containing specific ideas the US wishes to convey to domestic and foreign audiences, based on general US foreign policy, GA agenda items and the current international situation.

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Arms for the Arabs. Delay in concluding a Syrian-Israeli armistice, together with deferment of hope for an early Palestinian peace, combine to impose a strain on continued observance of the UN ban on arms shipments to Israel and the Arab states. The Israelis, who were able to draw on Czechoslovakia for their arms, never found themselves much hampered by the embargo. The Arabs, however, emerged from the recent hostilities with practically no arms left and are now asking for arms to maintain internal security. France, anxious to regain influence in its former mandates has probably already shipped small quantities of arms to the Syrians. The British, too, frankly seek a more liberal interpretation of the UN embargo which would permit them to supply weapons to Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. A problem arises in that it is difficult to earmark arms for such a purpose as internal security. Also, if any considerable quantity of arms were to be supplied to the Arab states, it would serve at the same time to stiffen their attitude at Lausanne. Moreover, there may be danger that even modest arms shipments might furnish Israeli hotheads with a pretext to resort to "anticipatory" measures against the Arabs.

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